Everyday ritual in the residential world by Enfield, N.
two 
Everyday Ritual in the 
Residential World I 
N. j. Enfield 
Instead, then, of merely an arbitrary period during which the exchange 
of messages occurs, we have a social encounter, a coming together that 
ritually regularizes the risks and opportunities face-to-face talk provides, 
enforcing the standards of modesty regarding self and considerateness 
for others generally enjoined in the community. 
-':'Erving Gottman, "Replies and Responses" 
This chapter is about everyday ritual in the residential world of the Kri, speakers of a Vietic (Austroasiatic) language of upland central 
Laos. I examine the relationship between the spatial layout of the Kri 
house and the everyday ritual behavior of the people in it. When inside 
a house, no matter whose house it is, a Kri person is not free to be just 
anywhere he or she likes. When carrying out everyday activities such 
as eating, working, sleeping, sitting, smoking, or talking, a Kri speaker 
may occupy space in a given house that is a function of that person's kin 
relation to the household and his or her status in terms of age and rank. 
To give a simple preview of the phenomenon, figure 2.1 shows two 
Kri families relaxing, seated at the fire pit in the center of their houses' 
interiors. Their seating placement is not random but proper according 
to Kri norms. The man of the house sits toward the outer-upper corner 
of the fire pit (see fig. 2.2). His wife sits toward the inner-upper corner. 
The photographer, as guest, is properly seated farther toward the outer 
wall of the house. In this chapter I layout the cultural logic of the Kri 
house floor plan in terms of inner, outer, upper, and lower dimensions 
and some ways in which Kri people ritually regiment their behavior 
(and that of others) in accordance with this logic. 
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Figure 2.1. Members of two Kri families relaxing at home. The man of the 
house sits to the outer-upper corner of the fire pit, his wife sits to the inner-
upper corner. In both photographs, the man sits slightly farther in the "upper" 
direction. 
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The ethnographic facts suggest some general properties of human 
ritual communication, whether it be in formal rituals such as weddings 
and initiations (Bloch 1974; Fortes 1966; Tambiah 1985) or in everyday 
rituals such as handshakes and observances of table manners (Goffman 
1967; Leach 1966). Formal rituals and everyday rituals are not different 
species but, as is widely acknowledged, represent relative regions on 
a continuum. l They share many of their important defining features. 
First, both formal rituals and everyday rituals are public behaviors 
concerned primarily with wielding influence in the social world. Their 
desired effects are brought about by affecting others' mental states 
and statuses. Because of this, the form or manner of those behaviors is 
constrained by the requirement that their meaning be recognizable to 
others. This recognizability is a general requirement of any social be-
havior (ritualized behavior most broadly construed; Huxley 1966a), but 
in ritual the manner of action becomes another sign in itself. Kinds of 
ritual can differ in the degree to which this formal component of the 
ritual behavior is thematized-that is, the degree to which it is a focus 
of attention or a consciously foregrounded feature of the current action. 
Second, and relatedly, the formal behavior of ritual provides a public 
opportunity for moral assessment of the status and identity of part-
icipants. How well I am regarded as an Australian middle-class boy may 
depend in part on whether I keep my elbows off the table at dinnertime. 
My status as a Lao man may be judged in part on whether I have been 
ordained as a monk at some point in my youth, and if so, for how long. 
Others can use such behavior as a basis of (moral) assessment of me in 
terms of how well I inhabit my status and identity. Correspondingly, 
I can strategically display such behavior to exploit these normative 
patterns of assessment and thereby manage others' impressions of me 
(Goffrnan 1967; ct. Krebs and Dawkins 1984; Owings and Morton 1998). 
How Manner Meets Manners in Everyday Ritual 
Manner: Formal Constraint for Recognizability and Evaluation 
Through formalization, ritual behavior is a way of acting in the world 
(Huxley 1966b: 258; Leach 1966: 403). As Leach pOinted ou~, "rational 
technical" behaviors have brute means-to-ends relations (e.g., chopping 
down a tree), whereas both communicative behaviors (e.g., English-
men shaking hands) and magical behaviors (e.g., swearing an oath) 
depend on social agreement to be effective. Although many researchers 
have wanted to distinguish firmly between the communicative and 
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the magical in ritual (ct. everyday versus formal), Leach argued that 
any such distinction was "either illusory or trivial," and so the term 
"ritual" should embrace both categories. They are alike in that they 
operate not by natural law but by virtue of social agreement that they 
should so operate (Watts 1999). An example is money: "It is only given 
the institution of money that I now have a five dollar bill in my hand. 
Take away the institution and all I have is a piece of paper with various 
gray and green markings" (Searle 1995: 27; see also Searle 1969: 51). 
In order that these effects are pOSSible, the actions by which we com-
municate must be sufficiently formalized to guarantee that the meaning 
of our behavior is recognizable to others. It is this recognizability alone 
that causes our communicative actions to work at all. This is true of 
nonhuman ritual behavior in the ethological sense. An example is the 
behavior of Labroides dimidiatus, a tropical fish that removes parasites 
from the bodies of other fish (Wickler 1966). Other fish make invitation 
displays before allowing the Labroides to feed on their bodies, and the 
Labroides also often does "a sort of dance" to elicit such invitation 
(Wickler 1966: 473). Nibbling on the bodies of other fish brings about 
the effects it does (the Labroides obtains food) by means of physically 
causal processes. By contrast, the efficacy of the Labroides' dance and 
of other fishes' gestural invitations depends on those actions being 
recognizable to the creatures involved (hence, as Wickler documents, 
the possibility of mimicking by other fish who attack the bodies of the 
submissive species instead of feeding on them). All of language, along 
with the rest of our symbolic resources, is predicated upon this notion 
of norm-governed recognizability of meaning (or action or intention). 
The mechanistic requirement that ritual behavior be formally recog-
nizable is a key conservative force in cultural practice generally. Accord-
ingly, Sacks (1992) defined culture as "an apparatus for generating 
recognizable action."z To effectively transform the world in a brute 
sense, one merely requires instrumental efficacy. If you want to break 
something, it doesn't much matter how you swing the hammer. But the 
communicative efficacy of a ritual action depends on its being socially 
recognizable by others as an instrument for its intended function. This 
constraint on form is thematized and exaggerated in formal rituals such 
as initiation rites, weddings, and political parades, where the defining 
actions need to be performed in just the right way if they are going to 
properly effect a social transformation (Austin 1962: 14ff.). As a result, 
social-cultural norms prescribe manner of action far more narrowly 
than would otherwise be required for purely instrumental purposes. 
A social task-be it requesting, complaining, telling, or grooming-is, 
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and should be, done in a quite particular manner, even when doing 
it in that manner is not causally necessary to achieving its function. 
Hence the local cultural tweaking of even the most everyday actions. 
For example, we can often recognize locals just by the way they walk, 
sit, or smoke a cigarette. We are usually oblivious to it, but the locally 
conservative nature of our conforming social behavior imports a strong 
sense of ritual to everyday social action (Goffman 1959, 1967). 
Manners: Ritual and the Cooperative Moral Order 
Ritual behavior requires two things that are both puzzling in human 
evolution and definitive of our species: cooperation and moral order 
(see, among others, Axelrod 1984; Boyd and Richerson 2006a, 2006b; 
Danielson 1998; Joyce 2006; Key and Aiello 1999; Knight, Power, and 
Watts 1995). Human groups cooperate in maintaining the collective 
illusions necessary for sustaining the meaning of ritual: 3 
Humans who participate collectively in magico-religious ritual perform-
ances do so precisely in order to instill belief in fictional "other worlds." 
Representations of such fictions are more than epiphenomenal; they 
are central in securing cognitive acknowledgement of an allegiance to 
the contractual intangibles underpinning cooperation in human social 
groups. Given the characteristically collaborative, cooperative nature 
of the rituals designed to generate such illusions, the "deceptions" 
which emerge may be dubbed "collective deceptions," corresponding 
to Durkheim's classic notion of "collective representations." (Knight, 
Dunbar, and Power 1999: 6; see also Knight, Power, and Watts 1995) 
Knight and colleagues were referring to the kinds of illusions entailed 
by religious beliefs and associated rituals (e.g., entertaining the reality 
of souls without bodies and of objects with souls, "a counterfactual 
and counterintuitive world of supernatural agents" [Atran 2002: 4; see 
also Bloom 2004; Boyer 1994, 2002]). But non magical, nonreligious, 
everyday institutional facts, like all forms of symbolic meaning, are 
equally dependent upon collective illusion. The idea that a piece of 
paper with gray and green markings can be equal in value to vital food or 
medicine is one such illusion. So is the idea that the noise corresponding 
to the phonetic transcription [kh<etJ is inherently connected with the 
essence of a feline. And so is the Kri idea that a son-in-law cannot 
approach the upper-outer corner of his father-in-Iaw's house. Although 
the objects of these beliefs are not intrinsic, natural truths (no physical 
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force literally prevents the son-in-Iaw's movement), they nevertheless 
become true by virtue of being collectively, publicly treated as true.4 
In this way, to engage in ritual behavior is to cooperate with one's 
group-mates in treating something as a natural fact when it is merely 
a social fact. This acquiescence to local convention is embodied in the 
observance of formal constraints on behavior and in the collective 
illusion (and attendant regimenting moral order) required to sustain 
them. We become constrained in our freedom to act, even in the most 
casual, everyday settings. Durkheim (1982 [1895]: 52) recognized this 
in defining social facts as "manners of acting, thinking and feeling 
external to the individual, which are invested with a coercive power by 
virtue of which they exercise control over him." As Knight wrote (1999: 
234), ritual is inherently unfair. If I am a Nuer boy having my brow 
cut to the bone as I ritually transition to manhood (Evans-Pritchard 
1940: 249), I might wonder why I wasn't born a girl. This is why ritual 
can be a political and a moral matter: political, because it invokes 
acquiescence to institutional facts, diminishing our individual agency 
(Kockelman 2007), and moral, because although ritual may not be fair, 
a person who does not acquiesce when he or she should is liable to 
sanction. And this moral sanction costs: "Moralistic punishment can 
stabilize any arbitrary behavior-wearing a tie, being kind to animals, 
or eating the brains of dead relatives ... when moralistic punishers are 
common, being punished is more costly than performing the sanctioned 
behavior" (Boyd and Richerson 2006b: 461). 
All these arbitrary behaviors are ritualized in the more general sense of 
Leach (1966) and Huxley (1966b). Whether it's fair or not that as a Nuer 
boy I must let my brow be cut to the bone or that as a Kri son-in-law 
I must cower in the inner corners of my father-in-law's house, it's the 
right thing to do. If I am going to do the right thing, I have to "suspend 
doubt and simply follow the prescribed practices" (Tambiah 1985: 131).5 
This is not unique to formal ritual. It comes with any collective illUSion, 
including such innocuities as "It's good to say Please and Thank you" 
and "It's bad to approach the r66ng of your father-in-Iaw's house." And 
the very ideas of good and bad, at the conceptual core of moral value 
(Wierzbicka 1996), are themselves inherently institutional; that is, that 
such-and-such is considered good or bad in a culture is necessarily an 
arbitrary, institutional, collective illusion, because it could be otherwise. 
Formal ritual is more easily seen as coercive than is everyday ritual 
(Bloch 1974). But everyday ritual is equally constraining. When 
Durkheim (1982 [189S]: 53) wrote of social "currents"-social facts not 
given by any explicit form of social organization-he said, "If perhaps I 
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abandon myself to them, I may not be conscious of the pressure they are 
exerting upon me, but that pressure makes its presence felt immediately 
I attemptto struggle againstthem" (see also Wittgenstein 1953: § 1.129). 
We are seldom aware of being subject to coercion by tacit norms, just 
as we remain unaware of the air we breathe: "Thus air does not cease 
to have weight, although we no longer feel that weight" (Durkheim 
1982 [1895]: 53). If we were to feel that weight, it might be enlightening 
(Whorf 1956: 209), but it might also be unbearable. Goffman vividly 
described the price paid by those who depart from normal or expected 
patterns of social conduct (Goffman 1963; see also Garfinkel 1967). Like 
formal ritual, everyday ritual"is not a 'free expression of emotions' but 
a disciplined rehearsal of 'right attitudes'" (Tambiah 1985: 134; see also 
Geertz 1966; Langer 1951). To sit in the right place in the Kri house 
is to display one's diScipline. Yet unlike formal rituals, such everyday 
ritual practices do not thematize the formal discipline on display. The 
message is given offrather than given (Goffman 1959: 2). Practicing the 
ritual indexes commitment to the collective norms and willingness to 
exercise the reqUired self-diSCipline in a way that is publicly evaluable.6 
As I show later, the diSCipline is regimented by cooperative adherence 
to normative practices. 
Summary: Everyday Ritual Is Where Manner and Manners Meet 
The key idea I want to draw from the foregoing discussion is the following: 
In all social communication, the manner in which an action is carried 
out is formally constrained by the requirement that it be recognizable 
to others as having the meaning it has. In ritual communication, of 
both the formal and everyday varieties, the manner of action is not 
merely instrumental in achieving public recognizability of the action's 
meaning. It is also itself made available for evaluation as a token of the 
actor's acquiescence to a constraint of social convention. Ritual is then a 
site in which the local moral order is displayed, exercised, and no doubt 
contested. In formal ritual, this evaluable manner of action tends to be 
a focus of attention, whereas in everyday ritual it tends not to be. But 
the coercive and regimenting nature of everyday ritual comes readily 
to the surface when the constraints are contravened. 
Kri Residence 
The Kri are a group of about 250 people living in the upper reaches of 
the Nrong Valley, in a protected rainforest in the easternmost area of 
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Nakai District of Khammouane Province, Laos. They live within a day's 
walk of the Vietnamese border at Ha Tinh Province. The Kri language 
belongs to the Vietic sub-branch of the Austroasiatic language family 
(Enfield and Diffloth 2009). 
In this section I describe the Kri house and its meaning in Kri daily life, 
looking particularly at the way people engage in practical interpretation 
of its meaning, regimented by the moral constraints of everyday ritual. 
Plan of the Kri House 
As is the case in any other culture, the spatial layout of the Kri house 
is charged with social meaning. The house "serves as much to reveal 
and display as it does to hide and protect ... , the physical structure, 
furnishing, social conventions and mental images of the house at once 
enabling, molding, informing and constraining the activities and ideas 
which unfold within its bounds" (Carsten and Hugh-Jones 1995: 2; see 
also, among others, Bourdieu 1990: 271ff.; Duranti 1981: ch. 4; Frake 
1975; Levi-Strauss 1963: ch. 8, 1987; Waterson 1990). The Kri word 
for house is kmooq (derived from kooq 'to live, remain, be somewhere', 
with infixation of the nominalizer -m-). The design of all Kri houses 
follows a standard, modular plan. The house is built entirely by hand, 
using machetes and no other tools. Materials are available exclusively 
from the forests surrounding the village: timber of various gauges for 
the main structure, varieties of bamboo for flooring, walls, and light 
structure, varieties of rattan for tying the structure together (no nails 
are used), and umbrella-size leaves of the culoo palm (Licuala grandis) 
for thatching. Houses differ in size as a function of individual necessity 
and motivation. A man may be more or less interested in having a large 
house. He might or might not want certain optional features such as a 
covered verandah in addition to an open-air verandah, or indeed, any 
kind of verandah. Numbers and sizes of internal partitioned rooms also 
differ, but the general layout is always the same. 
The floor plan of the Kri house interior is basically a square, onto 
whose two dimensions are mapped kinship (inner-outer) and social 
rank (upper-lower). Another way to think of it is that the house has four 
sides: upper, lower, inner, and outer. Figure 2.2 shows the plan of the 
house in which I stayed during field trips in 2005 and 2006. The house 
is fairly complete by Kri standards, featuring both a covered verandah 
and an open verandah. 
Social meaning is mapped onto the floor space by a simple organizing 
principle that crosses an inner-outer with an upper-lower axis. These 
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Figure 2.2. Plan of a typical Kri house. 





two axes more or less map onto a distinction of "in" versus "out" of a 
kin circle and "high" versus "low" on a scale of rank, defined by age 
and other indices of status. The lower side of the house is the side where 
people enter and exit. (There is no other passage in or out.) The lower 
side might be termed in English the front of the house. The upper side 
is the side farthest from the entrance. It corresponds to what would 
be called in English the back of the house. The upper-lower axis of 
the house is typically aligned with an up-down axis in local physical 
space, either the upstream-downstream orientation of the nearest river 
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or stream or the uphill-downhill orientation of the land on which the 
house is built (or both, since these are usually aligned with each other). 
Along the left-right axis as one enters the house, the inner side is the 
side of the house where family activities such as pounding rice (at a 
giant mortar, labeled tkoolq in figure 2.2), husking corn, and preparing 
and storing food take place.? A storage and work room called the siii is 
attached to the main structure of the house on this side. 
The outer side is where non-kinfolk should be. Certain signs make 
it publicly clear which is the outer side. The ladder up onto the house 
leads up on that side, and inside the house are other clues, such as the 
clear space called the r66ng in the upper-outer corner and the large 
diagonal beam running down along the roof, which joins the lower 
(front) wall of the house at the outer-lower side entrance. 
The house has a third spatial dimension as well: the vertical dimension, 
or above versus below. The Kri house is literally raised above ground 
level, as shown in figure 2.3. For talking about the various spatial 
relations within the house, Kri speakers use the following spatial terms: 
Above, upstream t66l'above, upper, upstream place' 
leeh 'there (above, upstream)' 
saaw'ascend' 
Below, downstream tirk 'below, lower, downstream place' 
c66h 'there (below, downstream), 
dih'descend' 
Across (in-out) seeh 'there (across ways)' 
Figure 2.3. Elevation of a Kri house, looking from the outer side-that is, from 
the left of figure 2.2. 
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Social Aspects of the Kri House 
The house plays a central role in Kri social organization. For one thing, 
it is where a great deal of social interaction takes place-where meals are 
shared, where gossip is exchanged, where stances are contested, where 
bonds are built, maintained, and eroded. In addition, the house has a 
special status in terms of kinship organization. Kri kinship is anchored 
in kmuuc kmooq 'spirits of the house', which belong to the man of the 
house. Each person belongs to the spirits of a single house, as determined 
by who owns the spirits of the house into which one is born (this may 
be one's father or grandfather). When formal rituals are performed for 
these spirits, as happens a few times a year, the rituals take place around 
a tiny, ceremonial fire pit located in the inner-uppermost corner of the 
house interior (fig. 2.2). 
A man's house spirits are not necessarily located physically in his own 
dwelling. For example, as a young man's nuclear family grows, he may 
build his own house and move to live there with his family while his 
father is still alive-as usually happens, given the physical constraints 
of houses. Because the son does not have his own spirits in his house, 
it is considered not a real kmooq 'house' but merely a tuup 'hut', despite 
its being structurally identical to a house. 
The structure shown in figure 2.4 (top) is regarded as a real kmooq 
'house'. It has its own spirits. Accordingly, there is a tiny fire pit in the 
innermost room (suamq; see fig. 2.2). The structure in figure 2.4 (bottom) 
belongs to a son of the man who built the first house. The Kri insist that 
the son's dwelling is not a real kmooq but a tuup, using the word for a 
simple little raised hut in the rice fields (fig. 2.5). Accordingly, although 
the house is fully functional, it has no such tiny fire pit in the inner 
sanctum. When the son, along with his family, performs formal rituals 
to his kin spirits, he does so in the father's house. 
The use of the word tuup for the house in figure 2.4 (bottom) is an 
example of the everyday collective illusion that defines ritual and other 
symbolic behavior for Knight, Dunbar, and Power (1999). To insist 
that the son's house in figure 2.4 is a "hut" is to ritually suspend the 
normal way of talking. It may be compared to any kind of avoidance 
behavior, such as using the word "mask" for "face" in fox-hunting, or 
avoiding words that sound like the names of recently deceased persons 
(see Dixon 1971). 
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Figure 2.4. Father's house (top) and son's house. 
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Figure 2.5. The usual referent of tuup 'field hut'. 
Practical Interpretation of the Kri Residence: Behaving in 
Accordance with Norms 
Kri people's daily behavior surrounding the house constitutes a domain 
of everyday ritual in which members of the community constantly display their cooperation with morally sanctionable social norms. Ad-hering to these constraints is, on the one hand, a product of these norms (Le., the norms are what cause the behavior) and, on the other, a way of bringing about or reinforcing the norms, by instantiating the normative behavior and thereby producing public signs that those norms apply. The norms are further reinforced when their contravention results in 
public sanctioning behavior, which involves thematization and explicit 
articulation of the normative practices and their meaning. 
I use the term "practical interpretation" to refer to people's behavior 
insofar as it constitutes evidence of their understanding of meaning in the physical world (Kockelman 2006). If I take a key and open a 
locked door with it, these actions constitute a display of evidence to any 
onlooker that I know what these instruments are for (Le., what their designers had in mind by designing them) and what may be achieved by 
their use. Similarly if I pick my teeth with a sliver of bamboo, I display 
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a practical interpretation of that object. I display that I recognize one of 
its affordances (or perhaps its function, if the sliver had been fashioned 
for that purpose). The same logic applies to actions of a more cultural 
nature. In general, the way we orient to things and events constitutes 
(evidence of) our understanding of those things. This may be evident, 
for example, in the physical world of affordances, instruments, and 
actions or in the cultural world of language, culture (roles, identities), 
and social interaction (Kockelman 2006; Sacks 1992). The spatial layout 
of the Kri house has meaning in this sense. Behavior that is oriented 
to the house in particular ways constitutes a range of interpretants of 
the house, and thereby a practical interpretation.8 
Physical behavior not only supplies an interpretation of what the house 
means but, more important, expresses an individual's commitment to 
and identification with social categories (roles and identities) that are 
implicated in those meanings. As a son-in-law, when I cower in the 
inner corner of my father-in-Iaw's house, I am not just being a son-in-
law, I am "doing" being a son-in-law (see Sacks 1992: 215ft.). I do what 
sons-in-law do, and in doing so I display that I am a (good) son-in-law. 
I categorize myself as a son-in-law by recognizably behaving like one. 
And the cause-and-effect relationship goes both ways: I act like this 
because I am a son-in-law; I am (categorized as) a son-in-law because 
I act like this. 
Goffman (1963: 2) observed that "society establishes the means of 
categorizing persons and the complement of attributes felt to be ord-
inary and natural for members of each of these categories." We have, 
then, roles such as mataam 'son-in-law' and identities such as Kri 'of Kri 
ethnicity' (Kockelman 2006). "We lean on these anticipations that we 
have, transforming them into normative expectations, into righteously 
presented demands" (Goffman 1963: 2).9 It is the business of ethno-
graphers (for types of roles or identities and for types of relationships 
implied by these) and biographers (for individuals and relationships 
between individuals) to define what constitutes such normative ex-
pectations in a community. 
I now turn to some of the everyday ritual constraints that Kri people 
are subject to. A first phenomenon is the forbidding (kJJI 'taboo') of 
certain people, at certain times, from going up into certain houses at all. 
For instance, when a women is menstruating, she is not to ascend any 
house but must 'stay down below' (kooq quu tirk c66h) or 'stay down on 
the ground' (kooq quu qatak c66h). At these times she sleeps in a separate 
menstruation hut (fig. 2.6). 
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(a) 
(b) 
Figure 2.6. Top: The woman holding the baby is menstruating and is not 
allowed to ascend the house. Her grandmother is on the verandah, helping with 
water, food for the baby, and so forth. The family's menstruation hut is visible in 
the left background. Bottom: The woman is inside the menstruation hut, talking 
with her husband, who stands outside. 
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Other forms of contamination can keep people down on the ground. 
For instance, the man pictured in figure 2.7 is contaminated from 
assisting with a childbirth some days earlier. He is not allowed (Le., it 
is k€€l 'taboo' for him) to ascend any house in the village other than 
his own house until such time as his contamination is resolved (qapw-h) 
by formal ritual. 
Figure 2.7. This man is contaminated because of having assisted during 
a childbirth some days prior. He cannot ascend another's house until his 
contamination is ritually resolved (qapifrh) . 
These are examples of the kinds of inconvenience to which people 
acquiesce on the basis of collective illusions about what can or cannot 
happen and what might happen as a result. The substance of the rule 
is illusory; there is nothing physically keeping them on the ground. Its 
effect is an inconvenience, and an unfair one at that: it's your tough luck 
if you happen to be affected. But cooperatively enforced social, moral 
norms turn the illusion into effective reality. As Boyd and Richerson 
(2006b: 461) point out, with moral enforcement, the alternative to the 
arbitrary behavior quickly becomes costlier than the inconvenience 
itself. More positively framed, the payoff of carrying out the arbitrary 
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behavior is the opportunity to be judged a good person in terms of roles 
such as son-in-law or identities such as Kri. 
I now turn to normative Kri practical interpretation of the house's 
floor plan. The inner side is where family members tend to reside, where 
housework (winnowing, pounding rice, etc.) takes place, where family 
members eat, and where they enter and exit the house. The outer side 
is more for non-kin, that is, guests. Women tend to sit toward the inner 
side of the house, and men, toward the outer side. On the upper-lower 
axis, people of higher status tend to sit toward the upper side, and those 
of lower status toward the lower side. By these criteria, it is often crystal 
clear where certain individuals ought to be. For example, a high-ranking 
guest who is not a family member sits toward the upper-outer corner. 
A son-in-law sits toward the inner-lower comer. The high rank of the 
man of the house tends to position him farther toward the outer side 
than his female housemates. An illustration of these prinCiples concerns 
the problem of where in the house to place kamiulng 'tray tables' for 
eating (fig. 2.8). 
Figure 2.B. Kri speakers eating around a kamaang 'tray table' (here, placed 
toward the house's inner side). 
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On a normal day during my fieldwork, the tray table at which I ate, 
always separately from my hosts, was placed on the floor on the outer 
side of the house, while the household's tray tables were placed toward 
the inner side. My tray table was typically placed slightly higher-that 
is, slightly more toward the upper side-than the family's tables. This 
placement accorded with my status as non-kin (outer) and honored 
guest (upper). 
A case illustrating the prinCiple of respecting the mapping of outer-
inner in terms of guests versus insiders arose when I visited a house while 
other visitors were also present. Food was served, and four tray tables 
were laid out across the house along the outer-inner axis. From outer 
side to inner, the groups seated at these tables were (1) the ethnographer 
and his official Lao government associate, (2) the man of the house, his 
son, and a Vietnamese hiker-trader guest, (3) the woman of the house, 
her daughter, and her niece, and (4) the son-in-law and his wife (fig. 
2.9). The last two sat out in the sia itself. 
The occasion depicted in figure 2.9 was purely informal. Other kinds 
of functional contexts result in other kinds of configurations. Figure 
2.10 shows a different occasion on which I observed four tray tables 
laid out in a line, this time during a formal ritual called qjak sii 'tying 
of (string on) the arms' (related to the Lao ritual called basii). The key 
event in this ritual is the tying of cotton strings around the wrists of 
an individual or members of a small group. The ritual is carried out 
ad hoc under a range of circumstances, such as a farewell, a return to 
good health after illness, or the death of a relative. A small number of 
people are targets of the ritual and have the strings tied around their 
wrists, one by one, by the many other participants present. Those who 
ritually tie the strings on the guests of honor do so as a kind of well-
wishing, and these people may be anyone from children to seniors, kin 
to outsiders. Associated with the string-tying component of the ritual 
event is eating and drinking. Because this is a formal ritual, the eating is 
ceremonial-that is, everyone has already eaten dinner at home earlier, 
and (unlike in the scene illustrated in fig. 2.9) the central goal of the 
event is not that everyone be full until the next meal. Those who are 
given food are the honored, respected guests, and naturally they are 
seated in the outer half of the house. In contrast to the layout of four 
tray tables for an everyday meal, in this case the tray tables were laid 
out not across the house but along the upper-to-Iower axis, lined up 
on the outer side of the house (fig. 2.10). 
This arrangement accorded with the food-giving of the event's being 
oriented exclusively to guests; hence all tray tables were on the house's 
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Figure 2.9. Layout of four tray tables, across the house, from outer 
side (foreground in photo) looking toward inner side. The people are (A) 
ethnographer (not shown in photo); (B) government chaperone of ethnographer 
(arm and knee visible to right of frame); (C) man of the house (leftmost in 
frame), (D) Vietnamese hiker-trader, passing through (next to his radio set), 
(E) C's son, (F) C's daughter, (G) C's wife, (H) C's niece, (I) C's eldest daughter, 
and 0) I's husband and C's son-in-law (visible in far background of photo). 







Figure 2.10. Tray tables laid out vertically on the outer side of the house for 
ritual eating during a qjak sii 'string-tying' event. 
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outer side. Within that placement, the seating of guests at each tray 
table was arranged from lowest to highest rank along the lower-upper 
axis. Naturally, the guests of honor-in this case, the ethnographer 
and his government sidekick-were seated at the uppermost of the 
four tray tables. 
An earthen jar called boomq in Kri-visible in the photograph in figure 
2.10 at the far end of the row of tray tables, with long bamboo straws 
sticking out of it-was full of brewed liquor, to be drunk after the eating. 
It was placed at the lower side of the house, a best compromise given 
that the practice of drinking must incorporate everyone, including 
sonS-in-law, who would be forbidden from entering the upper-outer 
corner. Such festivities invariably evolve into long drinking sessions 
involving men of all ranks. 10 The upper-outer quadrant (r66ng) remains 
clear for guests to relax in. 
Spatial Distributions and Diagrammatic [conicity 
The patterns by which people in the Kri world regularize their spatial 
distribution in the house provide an external, physical representation 
of the conceptual structure underlying norms of Kri social organiza-
tion. The Kri house functions as a diagram, a type of cognitive artifact 
(Norman 1991) by which people's inhabiting of different roles and 
identities can be read from their spatial behavior. Looking at where 
people place themselves in a given house is like looking at pieces on 
a chessboard. In the scenes I have considered so far, one sees people 
physically mapping their own token roles and identities onto type-
sanctioned spatial positions, the meaning of which has been inscribed 
through traditions of practical interpretation of the floor plan. When 
participants pOSition themselves appropriately, the entire structure 
becomes literally embodied, visible in space. The bodies occupying 
the house become nodes on a life-size diagram of their own roles and 
(inter)relationships. (On diagrams, see Enfield 2009: ch. 6 and references 
therein; on diagrammatic iconicity, see Peirce 1965 [1932].) 
Sanction of Norms: Making the Tacit Explicit 
Just as people's actions constitute evidence of the way they interpret the 
world around them (Kockelman 2006), so do their words. Most of the 
time, when life runs as it should, patterns of everyday ritual behavior go 
unquestioned. The norms themselves, or the formal aspects of behavior 
that embody them, remain out of any focus of attention. But when 
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transgressions occur, norms are thematized, made explicit, articulated, 
characterized, and reasoned about. It is when things depart from the 
plan that the norms behind everyday ritual come to the surface. By 
contrast, in formal ritual, participants are aware of the event's special 
status and to some degree of its social meaning. 
Early in my first extended field trip working with Kri speakers, I was 
blissfully unaware of the meaning of the Kri house. At a certain point 
I sat down, randomly, against the front wall of the house in the lower-
inner quadrant, and my host joked, /I Vook nik tOo mataam [Grandfather 
Nick is a son-in-law!]." It drew much laughter, as any in-law joke should 
do. This is when I first became explicitly aware of the social significance 
of the Kri house's floor plan. The normally implicit had to be articulated. 
Since then, I have invited many Kri speakers to explain to me the social 
meaning of the house's spatial layout. Their accounts are more or less 
identical: family to the inner side, guests to the outer side, high status 
to the upper side, low status to the lower side. It is also agreed that these 
are not unbreakable rules but general tendencies. 
The Kri speaker who joked about my sitting in the wrong part of the 
house treated my error as innocuous, if nevertheless worthy of remark. 
Perhaps as omni-ignorant ethnographer, I could not have known better. 
By contrast, I have heard sanction of outsiders who it seems should 
know better because they are regular overnight lodgers in these Villages. 
These are the Vietnamese hiker-traders who engage in small-time trade 
throughout the area. A group of women once described to me, with 
disapproval, some of these men's lack of observance of the meaning of 
the Kri house's floor plan. Some of these guests simply walk unhindered 
around the house-for example, crossing to the inner side and entering 
the sla 'work and storage room' to look for a knife, a bowl, or the like. 
It is not that an outsider is forbidden from doing this. But when one 
does need to contravene the norm, whether as a guest crossing to the 
inner side or a household member crossing to the outer side, one ought 
to display an explicit orientation to the problematic nature of this little 
transgression. 
The proper thing is to draw to the attention of those present that 
one needs to approach an inappropriate part of the house (requiring 
acknowledgment, thus as if asking permission) and to bow forward, 
lowering one's head and upper body while entering the problematic 
area. This marked manner of acting-creeping rather than walking-is 
an everyday ritual for displaying one's manners, one's willingness to 
cooperate with the local moral order. Failing to do so attracts moral 
condemnation. In passing moral judgments on their unmannered 
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hiker-trader guests for failing to correctly "ritually regularize the risks" 
of these social encounters (Goffman 1976), the Kri women added that 
this behavior caused them to feel afraid of their guests. This supports 
the view that ritual is a means of social control (Bloch 1974). When 
people fail to observe required behavioral constraints, they become 
unpredictable and therefore menacing (see Burgess 1962). In the context 
of a moral order that needs upholding, they are, simply, "bad." Such 
expressions of disapproval are where cultural values are made explicit. I I 
Another case of sanctioning concerns the behavior of children. When 
guests are present, children are told by their elders not to cross to the 
outer side of the house, and especially not to cross to the upper-outer 
corner (r66ng). This admonishment is especially likely to occur during 
formal ritual occasions, when manner of action is generally in the 
foreground. On one occasion, I was the guest of honor at a hand-tying 
ceremony. As was proper, I was situated in the upper-outer corner of 
the house (fig. 2.11). At a certain point during the string-tying part of 
the event, three young girls who were seated across the other side of 
the fire pit (prong kuujh) from me wanted to come to where I was in 
order to tie strings on my wrists. They had two paths available, the 
more direct one being to pass above the fire pit, and the other, to pass 
below it (fig. 2.12). As they set out to pass above, they were halted and 
sternly admonished by the man of the house, Non, who insisted they 
pass below the fire pit. 
This redirection would have been unlikely in a context other than 
formal ritual-for example, if one of the girls was simply going to pass 
me a spoon while I ate my evening meal in my usual spot in the upper-
outer corner. But in a context in which "doing a cultural practice" was 
thematized (as is seen to be definitive of formal ritual), it was more 
important that things be (seen to be) done in the right way. 12 As I argued 
earlier, in ritual, the manner of action becomes a sign in itself that may 
be inspected and evaluated for how well it conforms to local constraints. 
In a formal ritual setting such as this, when manner of action is a focus 
of attention, there is no doubt that Non's sanctioning behavior itself 
was a chance for him to display that he was a good Kri man by inSisting 
that things be done right. His admonition to the girls served as a sign 
on multiple levels. Among other things, it was (1) an instruction for 
the girls to go the other way, (2) a sign that it would be "not good" to 
take the upper route in this Situation, reiterating the moral norms at 
hand, and (3) a sign that he was a good Kri man for caring. 
A subtler form of explication of the norms of spatial meaning in the 
house is people's daily insistence, in the most informal situations, that I 
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Figure 2.11. Two views from the r66ng (upper-outer corner) during the ritual 
ceremony qjak sii, or "tying of the hands." Note the position of the women to 
the outer side (left background) in both pictures. In the top image, a son-in-law 
of the household can be seen in the far background, wearing a black-and-white 
jacket. In the bottom photo, the strings being draped on this ritually decorated 














Figure 2.12. Example of sanction during ritual ceremony. Three girls need to 
cross the house to tie strings on Nick's wrists. As they set out to take the most 
direct route (dotted-line arrow), they are admonished by the man of the house 
(Non), who tells them to take the correct lower route (solid-line arrow). 
sit in the upper-outer corner. If I sit close to the doorway, too far to the 
lower side, they usher me back (using the verb saaw 'ascend'). Again, 
this displays both the content of the norm itself and the degree to which 
people (want to be seen to) care about such norms' being followed.B 
In each of these cases of sanction, my hosts and I participate in the 
regimentation of norms. People are morally obliged to orient themselves 
properly (Le., to produce normative interpret ants) toward the physical 
behavior that the house invites. The required discipline constrains the 
actual possibilities to a tiny fraction of the conceivable next moves. 
So the restraint (an institutionally founded constraint) that morality 
imposes is ritual(ized) in this way (Hauser 2006). All these examples 
constitute the substance of norms in the sense that (1) the practices 
76 N. J. Enfield 
are observed (evidence that people are disposed to follow the norms); 
(2) when they are not observed, this occasions surprise, sanction, or 
both; and (3) when they are observed, no such surprise or sanction is 
evinced (or, to be precise, if anyone oriented himself or herself toward 
observance of these norms with surprise or sanction, that itself would 
occasion surprise or sanction). 
Conclusion 
Why does a Kri son-in-law confine himself to the lower-inner edges of 
his father-in-Iaw's house? Why is an honored guest ushered to the upper-
outer corner? Why, when a Kri man and wife sit down at home for a 
smoke after a long day in the fields, does the man sit on the outer corner 
of the fire pit while his wife sits toward the inner side? These everyday 
ritual behaviors provide ways of making public one's role or identity 
(whether given or given off; Goffman 1959) and to knowingly display 
how well one inhabits one's role or identity. This practical interpretation 
is at once a product of the individual's understanding of local norms, 
an index of those norms (constituting onlookers' evidence for them, 
whether as learners or users of the system), and a regimenting force 
for the cooperative, morally invested regularization of those norms. 
Practical interpretation of the semiotics of Kri residence allows com-
munity members to Signal, relatively cheaply, their commitment to 
current norms, with motivators such as a moral order and an emotional 
intelligence to enforce it, driving people both to conform and to enforce 
conformity. To paraphrase the passage from Goffman quoted at the 
opening of this chapter, by interpreting the spatial meaning of the 
house in these normative ways, Kri speakers ritually regularize the risks 
and opportunities that co-presence provides, enforcing the standards 
generally enjoined in the community. 
These everyday ritual practices substantiate and perpetuate social 
facts under the guise of brute facts (Searle 1995). No natural, causal 
law prevents a son-in-law from being in the upper-outer corner of his 
father-in-Iaw's house, but for him it is truly as if he is physically subject 
to an external constraint (Durkheim 1982 [1895]: 59; Levi-Strauss 1966: 
221). Logically, Searle is right to say that money is just paper, worth 
only what we socially agree it is worth. But our firsthand experience is 
the same as the experience Kri speakers have with the social diagram 
inscribed in their house floor plan. No amount of logic will divorce our 
sense of investment in the worth of money-or the pressure upon the 
son-in-law to stay in his place. This gives ritual its power. 
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As Goffman (1967, 1976) stressed, even the most mundane social 
encounter entails joint interpersonal commitment. Regardless of the 
nature of the exchange, one is obliged to pay attention to and engage 
with others, and one obliges others to pay attention and engage in re-
turn. Huxley's definition of ritual communication (1966b: 258) featured 
the twin objectives of "reducing damage" and "promoting bonding" in 
social relations. These are not so much about harmony as about politics 
(Bloch 1974),14 and everyday politics is delicate. Human inhibition and 
the morality associated with it mean that none but the most desperate 
Machiavellian intentions can be effected, baboonlike, with a random 
blow to the head in passing (Silk 2(02). Human social interaction seldom 
if ever goes without some attention to everyday ritual, buckling to its 
constraints as in formal ritual. The difference is whether the manner 
or formal execution of action is a focus of participants' attention. In 
both cases, the manner of action is available for moral evaluation. In 
this way, ritual behavior is both weapon and shield for handling the 
political and moral delicacy of social co-presence that characterizes 
human interaction. 
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1. The term "ritual" is used in the literature for at least three kinds of 
phenomena: ritualized communicative behavior in an ethological sense (Huxley 
1966b), which captures all linguistic and other human symbolic behavior 
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(Leach 1966: 404; Watts 1999); formal ritual, or "symbolic actions relating 
to the sacred" (Firth 1972: 3)-that is, more socially marked events such as 
weddings, initiations, swearings-in, and other rites of passage; and everyday 
ritual, the far more casual yet still formal procedures "of a communicative but 
arbitrary kind, having the effect of controlling or regularizing a social situation" 
(Firth 1972: 3)-for example, greetings ("Good morning") and politeness 
formulas ("Thank you"). For some, the category of everyday ritual permeates 
well beyond these easily recognized little exchanges. Goffman (1959, 1967), 
for example, pointed to the ritual nature of just about every move we make 
in social interaction. Whether or not scholars of ritual collectively wish to 
include under ritual communication both a wedding ceremony and a chat 
between cousins at the reception later on, we should be able to characterize 
the similarities and differences between those things that have been described 
as ritual to date and keep them terminologically distinct. 
2. Thanks to Federico Rossano for pointing out Sacks's phrase to me. 
3. I use the term "illusion" to avoid the agency implied by the word 
"deception" in the quoted passage. 
4. Learned disgust (e.g., at certain foods) is a good case of transposing the 
institutional to the brute (or social to causal, or cognitive to behavioral). 
S. This kind of unquestioning acceptance is arguably an innate form of 
docility (Simon 1990). Recent researchers evoke this as a key mechanism in 
cultural evolution and cultural learning: "The psychology of social learning 
should plaUSibly be arranged so that people have a strong tendency to adopt 
the views of the majority of those around them" (Richerson and Boyd 2005: 
122; see also Boyd and Richerson 2005; Gergely and Csibra 2006). It appears 
to be adaptive and economical to adopt the practices of one's consociates 
(Le., those with whom we identify) without asking why those things are (1) 
to be done and (2) to be done in that way. Although a cultural practice might 
be maladaptive (as some cultural practices are), chances are that if it has 
survived to be passed on, it is not maladaptive, and it may even be positively 
adaptive. At least, no (immediate) harm will likely be done in taking it on. 
Inconveniences ranging from keeping one's elbows off the dinner table to 
lying still while one's brow is cut to the bone are all, it seems, readily accepted 
by those who are inconvenienced by them. 
6. The inconvenience of ritual is far more apparent in formal rituals such 
as subincision, scarification, and circumcision, but in everyday ritual it is still 
there. This is especially clear when we compare ourselves with other beasts 
and note that only we humans are capable of inhibiting our compulSions to a 
degree sufficient to, for instance, remain in the dentist's chair for the duration 
of an appointment or refrain from reaching over in the subway and grabbing 
someone else's food when we are hungry (see Hauser 2006). 
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7. There is no fixed or absolute left-right mapping of the inner-outer axis. 
Some houses have the inner side on the left (e.g., fig. 2.1), and others, on 
the right (e.g., fig. 2.9). Compare the images in figure 2.4 , where the ladders 
leading up at the houses' outer sides are opposite to each other. 
8. Also following Kockelman (2006), I am interested in affordances and in-
struments as among those aspects of our world that are semiotic (see also 
Gibson 1979) and through which we may observe people interpreting their 
residential world. There is much to say regarding the affordances incorporated 
into the Kri house. To pick just one, there is the set of possibilities afforded by 
split-bamboo flooring: One may spit and drop rubbish through the floor at will. 
Description of the incorporation of affordances into the complex instrument 
called the krnooq 'house' is reserved for a more complete ethnography of Kri 
residence. 
9. Returning to the normally tacit, unthematized nature of everyday norms 
and rituals, Goffman (1963: 2-3) went on: "Typically, we do not become aware 
that we have made these demands or aware of what they are until an active 
question arises as to whether or not they will be fulfilled." Stigma arises when 
"usualness" is noticeably absent. 
10. Drinking has to be done in a certain order, because there is only one 
vessel to drink from. As for the serving of after-meal tea, its order is strictly by 
rank and is determined with great seriousness. 
11. This kind of explicit talk is part of the broader set of mechanisms 
for enculturation beyond mere practical-behavioral habituation. Although 
Bourdieu's theory of practice (1977, 1990) is often taken to deliver culture 
"Without articulation," it is clear from Bourdieu's work that it matters a great 
deal how people talk about their cultural world (Goddard 2002: 69; Hanks 
200S). 
12. Accordingly, during formal rituals among the Kri, I have observed those 
in charge bicker about "the right way to do it," or to self-sanction, saying that 
they themselves don't know how to do it. This is especially common among 
younger people during phases of the qjak sii ritual in which one is reqUired to 
chant short conventional phrases, which few people seem to have memorized 
correctly. This is not to say that the norms are absent in less formal contexts 
but merely that they are relatively relaxed and unthematized. But this is 
only relative. Some aspects of behavior and meaning of the house are strictly 
observed. For example, the constraint against a son-in-law or daughter-in-law 
being on the outer side of the house, especially in the outer-upper corner, is 
strong and laden with emotional response. People report that they simply 
could not bring themselves to step into that part of their parents-in-Iaw's 
house. 
80 N. I. Enfield 
13. There are practical issues, too. Wherever I am sitting, others will not 
want to sit "above" me, so if I sit too far toward the lower end of the house, an 
open area of house space becomes unusable for others. 
14. This is in line with Owings and Morton's (1998) model of animal vocal 
communication (following Krebs and Dawkins 1984). Their model is con-
structed on an assessment-management mechanism. The individual's powers 
of assessment (not necessarily dedicated to social interaction) are presupposed 
and exploited in the formulation of communicative behaviors in order to 
change the world in ways desired by the formulator of a message. In other 
words, what senders do is driven by what they anticipate receivers will do in 
response. 
